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Abstract 
This paper presents the privacy dictionary, a new linguistic resource for automated 
content analysis on privacy-related texts. To overcome the definitional challenges inherent in 
privacy research, the dictionary was informed by an inclusive set of relevant theoretical 
perspectives. Using methods from corpus linguistics, we constructed and validated eight 
dictionary categories on empirical material from a wide range of privacy sensitive contexts. It 
was shown that the dictionary categories are able to measure unique linguistic patterns within 
privacy discussions. At a time when privacy considerations are increasing, and online resources 
provide ever growing quantities of textual data, the privacy dictionary can play a significant role, 
not only for research in the social sciences, but also in technology design and policy making. 
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Introduction 
Questions surrounding privacy have gained increasing traction across academic 
disciplines, policy discourses, the media and everyday life. Nevertheless, privacy remains a 
concept that is notoriously hard to define and study. Relevant interdisciplinary work has 
illustrated many of its different parameters. Some studies have focused on how privacy is 
achieved behaviorally through actions of control (Tavani, 2007; Petronio, 2002; Adams & Sasse, 
1999; DeCew, 1997; Altman, 1975). Others have discussed its positive psychological effects 
(Pedersen, 1999; Altman, 1975; Westin, 1967), and noted its governance though social norms 
(Petronio, 2002; Adams & Sasse, 1999). Privacy not only entails the selective control over 
the physical realm (e.g. one’s sensory presence), but, depending on the interactional context, it 
can also involve informational (e.g. personal information) or expressive (e.g. one’s opinions and 
values) control (DeCew, 1997). Yet further work has described privacy as underpinned by an 
optimal desired state, which is dialectic in nature (Altman, 1975). Such conceptual diversity 
makes privacy research extremely challenging. Although syntheses of the literature have been 
attempted they have been unable to produce a consistent, uniform theory (Schoeman 1984; 
Parent 1983). Thus, privacy has been described as a concept in disarray, a chameleon word 
(Solove, 2008).  
At a time when theorists are still grappling with how to define it, privacy has become one 
of the most contested social issues of the information age (Strickland & Hunt, 2005). In the UK, 
a DNA profile is held on criminals, including those suspected, but not charged with a crime 
(Casciani, 2009). Workplace surveillance is an established practice (BBC news, 2003); and 
social network sites are thriving on people’s willingness to disclose and consume personal 
information (Vasalou et al., 2010). Understanding individuals’ privacy perceptions, particularly 
in relation to technology, has thus become a central question that cuts across a number of 
disciplines (e.g. human computer interaction, information science, communication studies, 
computer science). The present research builds on the recognition of a continuing need to 
advance theory-inclusive and sophisticated methods for studying privacy (Patil et al., 2006). 
Taking a holistic theoretical perspective, we developed a ‘privacy dictionary’ that can be 
implemented for automated content analysis to allow researchers to systematically measure 
different aspects and uses of privacy language.  
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The following section describes the methodological landscape against which automated 
content analysis becomes a useful tool for the study of privacy and outlines the benefits of our 
approach. We then explain how existing automated content analysis tools work in practice and 
how a new dictionary, such as our own, may operate within these tools. Next, the theoretical 
framework underpinning the design of the privacy dictionary is presented. We go on to describe 
two studies in which 355 dictionary words and eight categories were designed and evaluated. 
Our main finding is that categories included in the privacy dictionary are able to capture unique 
linguistic features in privacy language. The paper ends with a discussion of our findings and 
potential applications of the privacy dictionary in research, policy making and technology 
development. 
The Methodological Landscape of Privacy 
A number of methodologies have been employed to shed light in the privacy domain, 
creating a varied methodological landscape where survey-based methods have traditionally been 
particularly prevalent. However, while surveys may be able to gather people’s self-reported 
perceptions and attitudes, the assumption that these translate directly into related behaviours 
remains problematic (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2004). One of the major criticisms raised in 
relation to attitudinal questionnaires is that they frequently include leading items that bias 
participants’ responses (Harper & Singleton, 2001). This often results in inflated self-reports of 
privacy concerns that rarely explain privacy protective behaviour (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2004). 
When such questionnaires are used in experimental settings it has been shown that they can 
prime particular privacy-related behaviours. For example, one study found that participants 
avoided answering sensitive questions after completing a privacy concern measure (Joinson et 
al., 2008). The reliability of these methods has, therefore, been called into question (Patil et al., 
2006). 
Other methodological approaches have been developed to counter these problems, 
underpinned by the belief that natural language reveals attention patterns, thoughts, feelings, and 
provides a way of understanding our social worlds (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007; Tausczik & 
Pennebaker, 2010; Pennebaker et al., 2003). Some researchers use interviewing and focus groups 
to probe people as a means of deconstructing and analysing prior violations (e.g. Adams & 
Sasse, 1999; Raento & Oulasvirta, 2008). While this approach lends itself particularly well to 
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contexts with persistent privacy problems, helping to identify the source of the breach and 
participants’ judgments, it is limited insomuch as it does not capture naturally occurring privacy 
practices. These limitations have motivated privacy researchers to develop methods aimed at 
capturing more nuanced, inclusive and unbiased portrayals of people’s concerns, needs and 
practices. One way this has been done is by looking at privacy concerns and practices as 
embedded within various domains, in which different manifestations of privacy are gauged 
through neutral questions framed within these wider contexts, e.g., social network sites, mobile 
computing and healthcare (e.g. Christidi & Rosenbaum-Elliot, 2010; Mazanderani & Brown, 
2010). Another has been to use diary-based approaches such as experience sampling methods 
(ESM) as a means of prompting privacy responses in real time (e.g. Anthony et al., 2007; 
Mancini et al., 2009).  
In analysing participants’ privacy experiences through language, researchers have 
traditionally turned to qualitative methods such as thematic analysis to interpret their data. 
Against this context, automated content analysis offers the potential to advance existing analytic 
tools, either as a method in its own right or in conjunction with other analysis methods. First, 
automated content analysis can systematically measure specific psychological components, as 
such serving a parallel function to psychometric measures whose use is well established in the 
social sciences. Whilst in these latter cases individual questions are the observed items whose 
submission to statistical procedures, such as factor analysis, informs the researcher about 
unobserved latent variables, in automated content analysis words and phrases become the 
observed variables (Lowe, 2004). Indeed, with automated content analysis, it has been possible 
to reliably identify specific emotional states (Hancock et al., 2007; Gill et al., 2008), predict 
deception (Hancock et al., 2008) and detect differences in personalities (Oberlander & Gill, 
2006). Second, automated content analysis offers a common platform that yields comparable 
results within and across a large number of different datasets, such as interviews, focus groups 
and open-ended questions. As the coding is done consistently according to a common frame, the 
discrepancies that typically emerge due to different interpretations of coding schemes are 
prevented (Mehl & Gill, 2010). This is particularly useful when researchers want to minimise the 
subjectivity of individualised qualitative analysis in order to engage in collaborative work across 
a large body of texts. Third, when analysing more open-ended texts in which specific questions 
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on privacy have not explicitly been raised, either to prevent priming responses or else if the 
analysis being conducted is a secondary or post hoc one, automated content analysis can be used 
in conjunction with other analysis methods. For example, it can be used prior to qualitative 
thematic coding to pre-identify language of potential interest and hence save time and effort in 
the coding process (Mehl & Gill, 2010).  
Automated Content Analysis: Dictionaries and Software 
Automated content analysis software, with particular reference to category frequency 
software, at its core, uses a dictionary comprised of individual words or phrases that are assigned 
to one or more linguistic categories. The software will process any given number of texts by 
counting occurrences of each dictionary word within the text and incrementing the relevant 
categories to which the words belong. The output of the analysis consists of values for each 
linguistic category, represented as a percentage of the total words in the text. For example, in 
parsing the input text “I am”, a dictionary that includes the linguistic category “personal 
pronouns” would increment “personal pronouns” by one, assigning it a value of 50%. This 
analysis would be repeated for each input text individually yielding a matrix with category 
values stored (columns) for each case (row). 
The categories and words forming part of any dictionary vary depending on the aspects of 
language that researchers aim to measure and the social psychological phenomena they strive to 
understand (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Previous research has developed a number of 
linguistic categories ranging from functional aspects of language, such as first person singular 
pronouns (e.g., I, my, we), negations (e.g., no, never, not), to language that captures the content 
of communication, e.g. positive emotions (e.g., happy, pretty, good), achievement (e.g., try, goal, 
win). Examples of existing dictionaries include the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
(Pennebaker et al., 2007), the Affective Norms for English Text (ANEW) (Bradley and Lang, 
2007), Diction (Hart & Carroll, 2011) and the General Inquirer (Stone et al., 1966). With the 
exception of ANEW, these dictionaries are offered together with content analysis software that 
can be either downloaded on a personal computer or used over the Internet. Researchers who 
want to design a new dictionary that will operate within existing content analysis software can do 
so by consulting the manual accompanying each of these tools.  
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 From Theory to Language  
To choose words that are meaningful to the semantic analysis of privacy, we must begin 
from a sound and comprehensive theoretical foundation. Despite theorists’ agreement over 
several shared features, context determines much of the way that privacy has been defined. 
Therefore, in constructing a dictionary that would encompass all of these manifestations, we 
need to cast our net wider than existing definitions. Theories of categorization provide a useful 
frame for meeting this challenge. The classic approach to concept definition identifies sufficient 
and inclusive criteria (e.g. control over information). Any instance described by these criteria is 
considered to be a member of the concept (Rosch, 1978). Many natural language categories, 
however, do not share a common set of defining features. Taking games as an example, card-
games, board games and playing tennis bear a ‘family resemblance’ structure. Members 
characterized by more features of the family are better exemplars, thus making membership a 
matter of degree (Wittgenstein, 2001). Prototype theory evolved from this perspective to propose 
that concepts, such as privacy, are organized through prototypes that represent the average 
member of a concept. When new situations are perceived, we evaluate their similarity against the 
prototype to determine whether they belong to the concept and whether they are good or poor 
exemplars (Rosch, 1978).  
Solove (2006; 2008) proposed that the multifaceted perspectives adopted vis-à-vis 
privacy exist due to its family resemblance structure. Recent research validated this claim in a 
unilinear series of experiments (Vasalou et al., 2010). First, 146 participants were asked to report 
features of privacy. This resulted in an average of 6.6 features with a total of 82 privacy features. 
If a concept is organized around a prototype, a wide range of features will be reported, none of 
which are shared across all reports (Fehr, 1988). Crucially, this first study found no agreement on 
a single unifying feature of privacy. Second, it was determined whether participants could 
reliably rate the features’ importance or centrality with regards to the concept. Once it is shown 
that features of the concept vary in their degree of centrality, exemplars of the concept can be 
directly derived from the features (Fehr, 1988). Using a 9-point scale (9-extremely good feature, 
1-extremely poor feature), 118 participants were able to reliably rate the privacy features’ 
centrality. In a final step, 62 participants evaluated vignettes that contained either more central or 
peripheral features of the privacy concept. The vignettes containing more central privacy features 
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were recognized as better exemplars. Therefore, when participants faced events pertinent to 
privacy, the internal structure of privacy was found to have an effect on their cognition, which 
indeed demonstrates that membership is a matter of degree. 
The wide-ranging list of privacy features revealed in this research was found to cover the 
broad scope of psychological and behavioural components discussed in the privacy literature 
(Vasalou et al., 2010). This ensures that a dictionary built from this foundation will not be 
representative of a single theoretical view. Moreover, the features reflected the contextual nature 
of privacy we sought to capture, such that context was explicitly woven into language, 
expressing environmental (e.g. personal space), informational (e.g. personal information) and 
expressive concerns (e.g. concealing embarrassing details). The privacy dictionary was therefore 
developed on the basis of these 82 privacy prototype features.  
The remainder of the paper describes how the dictionary was designed and evaluated in a 
series of two studies. The purpose of Study 1 was two-fold: (1) to choose individual dictionary 
words that can be grouped into theoretically motivated categories and (2) to evaluate whether the 
resultant dictionary categories measure differences between privacy language and general 
language use. Study 2 aimed at replicating the findings of Study 1 by evaluating the dictionary 
categories within a second linguistic corpus that was independent of that used for the dictionary 
development. 
Study 1 
 Dataset 
To carry out the dictionary development and analysis, we needed a dataset of language 
both rich in privacy content and general language use. To our knowledge, a repository of data did 
not exist to satisfy these requirements. For this reason, we built our own dataset by combining 
two sources of data: (1) one-to-one interviews and focus groups that captured natural patterns of 
privacy practices and (2) self-reported privacy concerns and violations. In each instance, a 
within-subject design was followed; for each participant, we collected both a sample of privacy 
language forming a ‘privacy condition’ and a sample of general language use forming a ‘control 
condition’. 
Privacy practices  
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Eight contexts that previous research suggests are sensitive to privacy issues were 
chosen. These were: (1) criminal offences and imprisonment (Pattenden & Skinns, 2010) (2) 
children and the Internet (Livingstone, 2006); (3) financial exclusion (Leyshon et al., 2006); (4) 
sexuality (Meerabeau, 2001); (5) sharing in social network sites (Christidi & Rosenbaum-Elliot, 
2010); (6) experiences of elderly people with medical care (Costello, 2001); (7) health 
experiences within medical practices (DeCew, 2000); (8) the role of cultural identity in 
community participation (Petronio, 2002). We visited the UK Data Archive (hosted on the ESDS 
site: www.esds.ac.uk), which is a central data bank of previously UK-funded research, or 
contacted researchers who had worked on these topics to identify pre-existing datasets. The aim 
was to find qualitative data rich in privacy content, which had been generated by asking 
questions unrelated to privacy, in order to avoid methodological problems of priming in the 
responses. The data included fully abided with participants’ informed consent and the 
institutions’ ethics approval procedures. 
A team of five judges who were knowledgeable in privacy theory selected appropriate 
transcripts using the following procedure. Two researchers worked on each context. The first 
judge surveyed the entire panel of transcripts made available in order to identify a maximum of 
five transcripts per context that involved a diversity of privacy-related issues. This yielded a total 
of 38 transcripts1. Focusing on one transcript at a time, the same judge identified areas in the text 
where participants expressed privacy-related issues. These segments were examined by the 
second judge who raised any disagreements concerning the inclusion of a given privacy text. 
Disagreements between judges were resolved through discussion and only privacy texts that 
yielded bilateral agreement were included. Language identified as expressing privacy 
experiences was categorised in the privacy condition while the remaining interview formed part 
of the control condition. 
Privacy concerns and violations  
The second source of data consisted of open-ended descriptions of privacy concerns or 
violations. To bypass the issue of experimenter priming, we collected blog posts in which 
authors had provided spontaneous descriptions of such events. Data collection was limited to 
blogspot.com, which is the most popular blogging service2. Using Google’s search engine, we 
searched for the keyword ‘privacy’, limiting the pages to those hosted in the United Kingdom 
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only. Software written in the Python language was then used to collect and store blog post 
entries. To obtain data for the control condition, the software automatically collected the blog 
post immediately preceding the privacy post, from the same blog. 
This process resulted in the collection of 859 blog posts. Two judges, knowledgeable in 
privacy theory, worked together to evaluate their integrity. The first judge read over each privacy 
related post to verify that it described a privacy concern or violation in its entirety. It was found 
that many entries included brief and isolated references to privacy whereby the chief topic of the 
post was irrelevant. These were excluded from the dataset. Moreover, a number of blog posts 
featured adverts for privacy protection software that were also discarded. Next, we turned to the 
blog posts forming the control condition and verified each one individually to ensure that they 
did not include any references to privacy. In cases where privacy was the topic of the post, it was 
replaced with the previous entry. A second judge went on to evaluate this reduced dataset, 
raising any objections over the inclusion of a given post. The blog dataset was the product of 
unilateral agreement between the two judges and it included 129 posts of privacy violations and, 
129 non-privacy posts respectively. As with the privacy practices dataset, this data source 
captured a rich range of contexts: some blog authors described concerns or violations in social 
network sites and the Internet more generally. Other blog posts focused on particular victims 
such as children, or people whose sexuality was exposed. The events described were seen as 
threatening people’s quality of life, financial wellbeing and health. Finally, some bloggers 
described the legal and political dimensions of privacy. Table 1 summarizes the dataset 
consolidating these two data sources. 
Table 1: Total number of words across the two datasets. 
Methodology Dataset type Privacy condition Control condition Total 
Interviews and 
focus groups 
(N=38) 
Privacy practices 65,324  
 
168,472 
 
233,796 
 
Self-reports 
(N=129) 
Privacy concerns/ 
violations 117,551 
79,312 196,863 
  182,875 247,784 430,459 
Dictionary Words and Categories 
In designing the dictionary, iterative techniques, similar to those applied in the 
development of similar dictionaries were used (cf. Pennebaker et al., 2007). After collecting a 
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panel of relevant words, groups of judges who were knowledgeable in privacy theory decided 
whether they should be included in or excluded from the dictionary, and how they should be 
grouped into categories.  
The 82 privacy prototype features were first surveyed to identify and retain single word 
features (e.g. isolation). Phrases (e.g. keeping to oneself) were reduced to single words, where 
possible, so as to ensure maximal compatibility with automated content analysis software and 
dictionaries (e.g. LIWC software: Pennebaker et al., 2007). To give one example, “having 
control over one’s information” was broken down into two linguistic units, control and 
information. These revised prototype words were then used as “seed words” over several 
iterations to generate additional synonyms and antonyms using traditional and computational 
semantic dictionaries and thesauri.  Two judges evaluated the consistency of the additional 
synonyms and antonyms with the original words, with consensus between judges determining a 
word’s inclusion or exclusion. This resulted in the selection of 730 dictionary words.  
In a first step, frequency counts for each dictionary word were calculated on the language 
contained in the privacy condition of our dataset. This was done to ensure that words achieve an 
acceptable frequency of usage when people are talking about privacy related issues. One 
particular problem of using low-frequency words is that of sparse data, which is more likely to 
lead to skewed distributions. Words used less than two times were excluded resulting in 487 
dictionary words. In a second step, three judges conducted ‘key word in context’ analysis 
(KWIC) (Rayson, 2009) on the dictionary words as they appeared in the privacy condition and in 
the control condition. This allowed us to obtain contextual information of the occurrence of the 
dictionary words. Table 2 provides an example KWIC output for the word ‘public’. The KWIC 
analysis helped identify words for possible exclusion. Despite the frequent use of certain words 
in discussions around privacy, their high frequency in the control condition indicated that they 
were ubiquitous in language more generally (e.g. talking). Moreover, the reduction of multi-word 
prototype features to single words led to some words capturing unintended meanings from those 
originally envisaged by the judges. For example, the word ‘company’ was intended to capture 
the state of ‘having or not having company’, but instead the analysis of the context in which this 
word was used revealed that it was more frequently used to refer to a business organization.  
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Table 2: Examples of KWIC analysis for the word ‘public’. 
Members had said they were unsure about how  public their information had become. 
We consider it crucial that there is no public disclosure of this information. 
Blogging is essentially a  public rather than a private activity. 
Are you saying sir, that in a  
 
public place, I have to ask permission of every 
person in my picture? 
I don't understand why these things should be public It 's just bizarre. 
In both cases, we sought to determine whether the ‘problematic’ word was used 
consistently (i.e., appearing a minimum of two times) in the form of a phrase, either when talking 
about privacy-related matters or in the more general language use captured through the control 
condition. Aiming to ‘contextualise’ single words by replacing them with phrases, we used n-
gram software (Banerjee & Pedersen, 2003) to identify phrase clusters, i.e., two-word sequences 
preceding and following the word under investigation. Consistent phrases within the privacy 
condition were included in the dictionary in place of the single word. Per contra, phrases that 
were ubiquitous in the general language captured in the control condition were excluded from the 
dictionary. Wherever it was not possible to contextualise a word, the disputed word was removed 
from the dictionary. This iterative process yielded the final 355 dictionary words and phrases. 
Table 3 presents several examples of phrase clusters. 
Table 3: Cluster examples (the original single dictionary words appear in bold). 
Phrases excluded from the dictionary Phrases included in the dictionary 
public confidence 
security staff 
let alone 
deputy judge 
I’m afraid that 
emotional support 
sexual behaviour 
closely watched 
lack of control 
reasonable suspicion 
The third and final stage in the dictionary development was to construct theoretically 
sound categories of semantically similar words, which would form the basis of the output of the 
analyses carried out using the privacy dictionary. This is necessary to enable the measurement of 
consistent and reliable categories that can provide theoretically meaningful results. For this task 
an additional judge was recruited who was familiar with linguistics and automated content 
analysis. While consulting the semantics of each word as it appeared in context (KWIC), four 
researchers worked together to construct eight categories. These categories were further verified 
using Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1997). LSA is a computational 
semantic technique that represents a word’s meaning as a high-dimensional vector space derived 
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from the word’s contextual information within a corpus of text. Using the LSA website 
(http://lsa.colorado.edu), we performed a matrix comparison based on the semantic space of the 
TASA corpus of General Reading. The resulting matrix provides a cosine value after comparing 
the vectors associated with any two of the input words. A cosine close to +1 indicates a very high 
degree of semantic relatedness between words, whereas -1 indicates semantic dissimilarity. 
Although these values are theoretical extremes on a scale, they rarely reach +1 or -1. We 
consulted this matrix to verify that words grouped together had high semantic relatedness. If a 
word had a very low or negative cosine with two or more words within its respective category, it 
was reassessed through KWIC analysis in order to assign it to a more appropriate category. The 
following eight high-level categories are the result of unilateral consensus between the 
participating researchers. 
• NegativePrivacy (120 words or phrases; e.g., judgmental, troubled, interfere). This category 
captures the antecedents and consequences of privacy violations. NegativePrivacy includes 
words that relate back to privacy concerns, risks, as well as judgments about the source and 
type of violation (e.g. Adams & Sasse, 1999; Buchanan et al., 2007; Yao et al., 2007). 
• NormsRequisites (33 words or phrases; e.g., consent, respect, discrete). NormsRequisites 
encapsulates the norms, beliefs and expectations in relation to achieving privacy. This 
category can be used to appraise the presence and type of norms that govern each context 
(e.g. Petronio, 2002; Nissenbaum, 2004) 
• OutcomeState (39 words or phrases; e.g., freedom, separation, alone). OutcomeState 
includes words that describe the static behavioural states and the outcomes that are served 
through privacy. This category is in alignment to Westin’s definition of privacy states and 
functions (e.g. Westin, 1967; Pedersen, 1999). 
• PrivateSecret (22 words or phrases; e.g., secret, intimate, data). PrivateSecret includes 
descriptors or words that express the ‘content’ of privacy. This category can be used to 
understand precisely what aspects people regard as being private (e.g. DeCew, 1997; Tavani, 
2007). 
• Intimacy (22 words or phrases, e.g., trust, friendship, confide). Intimacy comprises of words 
that portray and measure different facets of small group privacy. It includes words that refer 
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to the psychological requisites in opening up to another person, as well as the emotional 
closeness that develops between people (e.g. Westin, 1967; Schoeman, 1984; Petronio, 
2002). 
• Law (27 words or phrases; e.g., confidentiality, policy, offence). This linguistic category 
includes words employed to describe legal definitions of privacy (e.g. Regan 1995; Rule 
2007).  
• Restriction (63 words or phrases, e.g. conceal, lock, exclude). Words in this category 
express the closed, restrictive and regulatory behaviours employed in maintaining privacy. 
Thus, the Restriction category can be used to measure the behaviours that people take in 
order to protect their privacy (e.g. Petronio, 2002; Tavani, 2007). 
• OpenVisible (46 words or phrases, e.g. post, display, accessible). This category includes 
words that represent the dialectic openness of privacy (e.g. Altman, 1975; Petronio, 2002). 
The final dictionary was formatted to be compatible with LIWC 2007, but analysis was 
conducted using the TAWC open source version of the LIWC word count software (Kramer et 
al., 2004). 
Results and Discussion 
The 334 texts of our dataset (167 belonging to the privacy and 167 belonging to the 
control condition) were processed so that word counts for each dictionary category were saved 
into eight separate variables. Table 4 presents the mean word occurrence and percentages for 
each dictionary category.  
Table 4: Mean word counts (percentages) for privacy categories. 
 Control Condition  Privacy Condition  
OpenVisible 3.01 (0.29%) 7.05 (0.63%) 
PrivateSecret 1 (0.07%) 5.75 (0.69%) 
Intimacy 4.51 (0.29%) 5.66 (0.47%) 
NegativePrivacy 2.07 (0.15%) 5.5 (0.53%) 
OutcomeState 0.88 (0.08%) 3.35 (0.33%) 
Law 0.86 (0.10%) 3.05 (0.20%) 
NormsRequisites 0.8 (0.05%) 2.5 (0.21%) 
Restriction 1 (0.11%) 2.43 (0.24%) 
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The output of this analysis was subjected to a series of GLM regressions with the word 
count of the privacy categories as the dependent variable. The privacy and control condition was 
the independent variable. The control condition served as the reference category. Given that 
participants spoke, or wrote, in variable rates (M=1,305; SD=2,035), the log of the total words 
used in each condition was defined as an offset variable to control for this confound. The 
Pearson Chi-square/df goodness of fit measure for each regression model ranged between 2 and 
7 indicating the presence of overdispersion (i.e. high number of zeros in the dependent variable). 
Therefore, a negative binomial regression model was fitted to the data. For all analyses, we 
checked that the conditions of application were respected using residuals analyses (residuals vs. 
fit and Cook’s distance). In all eight regressions, the likelihood ratio chi-square test was 
significant at the .001 level indicating that the fitted model was significantly better than the 
intercept-only model.  
Table 5: Likelihood ratio chi-square test. 
 Likelihood ratio chi-square 
Law 33.018*** 
OpenVisible 16.595*** 
OutcomeState 81.066*** 
NormsRequisites 61.531*** 
Restriction 44.664*** 
NegativePrivacy 73.081*** 
Intimacy 12.557*** 
PrivateSecret 188.853*** 
In each model, the effect of condition was statistically significant. To interpret 
differences in category word rates between conditions, the coefficients were converted to rates 
through the exponential function. The fitted model was subtracted from the intercept model to 
obtain rate differences between the privacy and control condition. To gain an estimate of word 
occurrence for a given text segment of 1,000 words, rate difference was multiplied by 1,000. 
Compared to the control condition, for every 1,000 words, participants speaking about privacy 
used 5.7 words more for PrivateSecret, 3.7 for NegativePrivacy, 2.65 for OpenVisible, 2.55 for 
OutcomeState, 1.8 for Intimacy, 1.6 for NormsRequisites, 1.54 for Restriction, 1.4 for Law.  
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Table 6: Coefficients and chi-square results. 
  B S.E. 95% Wald 
Confidence 
Interval 
Wald Chi 
Square 
    Lower Upper  
Law Intercept -7.101 .134 -7.363 -6.839 62882.299*** 
 Condition  .995 .167 .627 1.282 32.640*** 
OpenVisible Intercept -5.634 .10 -5.836 -5.432 6221.235*** 
 Condition .554 .14 .287 .82 16.606*** 
OutcomeState Intercept -7.196 .13 -7.5 -6.9 6117.219*** 
 Condition 1.480 .17 1.156 1.80 80.341*** 
NormsRequisites Intercept -7.5 .141 -7.77 -7.2 6146.304*** 
 Condition 1.355 .173 1.01 1.7 60.695*** 
Restriction Intercept -7.197 .13 -7.5 -6.9 6295.453*** 
 Condition 1.116 .168 .778 1.4 44.507*** 
NegativePrivacy Intercept -6.514 .114 -6.737 -6.29 6527.593*** 
 Condition 1.254 .145 .968 1.54 74.017*** 
Intimacy Intercept -5.81 .098 -6.001 -5.618 7065.020*** 
 Condition .471 .133 .212 .731 12.634*** 
PrivateSecret Intercept -7.26 .13 -7.52 -7.00 5899.306*** 
 Condition 2.210 .16 1.90 2.52 190.075*** 
These initial findings are encouraging. The eight dictionary categories were able to 
measure linguistic patterns in the language contained within the privacy condition when 
compared to the control condition. Nonetheless, given that the dictionary was designed and then 
evaluated on the same dataset, there is a possibility of over-fitting our dictionary to one dataset. 
For this reason, in Study 2 we collected a new dataset, on which the dictionary had not been 
trained, with the aim to replicate the findings of Study 1. 
Study 2 
Procedure and Participants 
A message was posted on a University intranet website inviting staff and students to take 
part in an online survey that aimed to capture a taxonomy of everyday life events. In total, 210 
people took part of which 143 were female. The mean age was 26.8 (SD=9). After responding to 
some demographic questions, participants were assigned to one of two conditions. In the control 
condition, participants were requested to report events that had happened during the previous 
week as if they were addressing a good friend. These instructions were aimed at producing more 
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naturalistic language. By contrast, in the privacy condition, participants were asked to describe a 
past event during which they felt their privacy had been violated either by another person, a 
group or an organisation. The final dataset comprised of 38,966 words, of which 29,757 
belonged to the control condition and 9,209 belonged to the privacy condition. 
Results and Discussion  
Word counts for the eight dictionary categories were calculated on the 210 texts (105 
belonging to the privacy and 105 belonging to the control condition) using the TAWC software. 
Table 7 presents the mean category word occurrence and percentages for the dictionary 
categories.  
Table 7: Mean word counts (percentages) for privacy categories. 
 Control Condition  Privacy Condition  
OpenVisible .11 0.05%  .38 0.48% 
PrivateSecret .12 0.04%  1.13 1.50% 
Intimacy 1.12 0.41%  .44 0.49% 
NegativePrivacy .16 0.05% .84 0.87% 
OutcomeState .30 0.11% .25 0.29% 
Law .0 0.00% .08 0.09% 
NormsRequisites .12 0.04% .23 0.32% 
Restriction .27 0.10%  .33 0.38%  
As Table 7 indicates, participants talked very infrequently about the legal dimensions of 
privacy in both conditions, which resulted in the Law category being dropped from subsequent 
analysis. Seven GLM regressions were calculated with the word count of the privacy categories 
as the dependent variable. The privacy and control condition was the independent variable with 
the control condition serving as the reference category. Participants, on average, wrote 185 
words (SD=143). The log of the total words used in each condition was defined as an offset 
variable to control for variable word rates across participants. An examination of the Pearson 
Chi-square/df goodness of fit measure for each dependent variable indicated that a Poisson 
regression model was appropriate. Conditions of application were respected using residuals 
analyses. With the exception of Intimacy, which was non-significant, in the remaining six 
regressions, the likelihood ratio chi-square test was significant at the .001 level indicating that 
the fitted model was significantly better than the intercept-only model.  
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Table 8: Likelihood ratio chi-square test.  
 Likelihood ratio chi-square 
OpenVisible 65.70*** 
OutcomeState 14.48*** 
NormsRequisites 28.28*** 
Restriction 29.517*** 
NegativePrivacy 172.60*** 
Intimacy 2.06, ns 
PrivateSecret 268.10*** 
An examination of the five models that yielded significance shows that the effect of 
condition was statistically significant in the predicted direction. To interpret differences between 
conditions, the same procedure used in Study 1 was applied in order to convert the log of words 
to word rates per 1,000 words. Compared to the control condition, for every 1,000 words, when 
talking about privacy participants used 12.6 words more for PrivateSecret, 9.1 for 
NegativePrivacy, 4 for OpenVisible, 2.6 for Restriction, 2.17 for NormsRequisites and 1.9 for 
OutcomeState.  
Table 9: Coefficients and chi-square results. 
  B S.E. 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval 
Wald Chi 
Square 
    Lower Upper  
OpenVisible Intercept -7.816 .2887 -8.382 -7.250 733.062*** 
 Condition 2.377 .3291 1.732 3.022 52.149*** 
OutcomeState Intercept -6.867 .1796 -7.219 -6.515 1461.755*** 
 Condition 1.035 .2632 .519 1.551 15.451*** 
NormsRequisites Intercept -7.736 .2774  -8.279 -7.192 777.968*** 
 Condition 1.786  .3444  1.111  2.461 26.897***  
Restriction Intercept -6.969 .1890 -7.339 -6.598 1359.725*** 
 Condition 1.396 .2535 .899 1.893 30.316*** 
NegativePrivacy Intercept -7.468 .2425 -7.943 -6.992 948.007*** 
 Condition 2.828 .2647 2.310 3.347 114.179*** 
PrivateSecret Intercept -7.736 .2774 -8.279 -7.192 777.968*** 
 Condition 3.395 .2920 2.823 3.968 135.226*** 
These findings lend further support to the function of six out of eight dictionary 
categories. Two categories that did not function as predicted, Intimacy and Law, are likely due to 
the nature of the data analysed. The category Law includes technical privacy terms relating to the 
legal protection of privacy. It is likely that laypeople engage less in legal privacy related 
discussions, which may be limited to expert legal commentators like some of the blog authors of 
the first study. The category Intimacy measures the positive function of privacy achieved within 
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groups of intimate others. Since participants were asked to describe events in which their privacy 
was violated, the importance of intimacy may have been dampened. However, in looking at the 
word percentages across the control and privacy condition (see Table 7), words from this 
category, on average, appeared equally frequently. A closer examination of the texts revealed 
that participants in the privacy condition described situations in which intimacy had been 
violated, whereas participants in the control condition described intimate events of the previous 
week. Thus, the instructions employed in the control condition primed intimacy, as a 
consequence masking differences between conditions.   
Discussion 
This paper discussed the development and evaluation of a privacy dictionary whose 
objective is to assist researchers in conducting automated content analysis of texts and 
transcripts. Most importantly, the prototype perspective that guided the dictionary development 
integrated numerous theoretical definitions of privacy, thus removing bias that may result from 
theory-based methods. The privacy dictionary provides a valuable addition to the arsenal of tools 
available for the study of privacy fulfilling the need for a shared and common methodological 
platform for privacy research. Through the dictionary, it is now possible to compare a number of 
different studies. This cumulative information can help to draw meaningful conclusions about 
particular privacy sensitive domains. In addition, the dictionary complements recent 
methodological approaches to privacy (whereby participants are not prodded with directive 
questions) by providing a tool that measures the expression of naturally unfolding experiences. 
From a purely practical perspective, the dictionary can process large quantities of textual data, 
and as such supplement laborious and time-consuming human coding by pre-identifying 
language of interest. In doing so, it also supports new developments in the social sciences and e-
research where researchers have increasingly begun to mine naturalistic data from online 
communities and social media (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Thus, the privacy dictionary 
provides researchers with a new resource to measure privacy perceptions as they are expressed in 
online settings.   
Using a contextually rich linguistic dataset, representative of privacy language, the first 
study found that the eight dictionary categories were used significantly more in the privacy 
condition relative to the control condition. By order of importance, participants talked about the 
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realms that privacy protects, e.g., data, secrets (PrivateSecret category). They included 
descriptions anchored on negative privacy experiences, e.g., feeling intruded upon, embarrassed, 
threatened, (NegativePrivacy category), as well as talked about the open behaviours and states 
that characterise privacy, e.g., post, display, accessible (OpenVisible category). Participants 
described the static behavioural states through which people achieve privacy and the outcomes it 
serves, e.g. safety, alone (OutcomeState category). They used words that referred to intimacy 
shared with other people or within groups, e.g. trust, closeness (Intimacy category), talked about 
the norms and expectations that govern privacy, e.g., discretion, respect (NormsRequisites 
category) and discussed the various behaviours used to manage and protect privacy, e.g., control, 
hide (Restriction category). Finally, participants used words pertaining to the legal boundaries of 
privacy, e.g. lawful, offence (Law category). 
Study 2 used a new dataset that replicated the majority of these findings. In particular, 
compared to the control condition, participants of the privacy condition used more words from 
six dictionary categories: PrivateSecret, NegativePrivacy, OpenVisible, Restriction, 
NormsRequisites and OutcomeState. The privacy condition of the second dataset contained 
notably fewer words (9,209 words) than the privacy condition of the first linguistic corpus 
(182,875 words). Against the more stringent conditions of Study 2, the finding that six categories 
capture differences between privacy language and non-privacy language indicates that the 
dictionary categories are robust. As the dataset of Study 2 contained laypeople’s descriptions of 
personal privacy violations, it is not surprising that participants failed to describe the legal 
dimension of privacy measured through the dictionary category Law. The finding that 
participants of both conditions used equal word rates from the category Intimacy, however, is 
demonstrative of the cautious approach researchers must take to ensure that the dictionary 
remains an accurate measurement tool. In general, a careful methodology was used to construct 
the datasets for both studies so that they capture genuine episodes of privacy that will be in turn 
measurable through language. Yet, Study 2 inadvertently primed descriptions of intimacy in the 
control condition, a methodological limitation that was only revealed upon closer examination of 
the nature of the texts. Thus, after the use of any automated content analysis, a second, 
interpretive stage of analysis (e.g. key word in context analysis) must be undertaken to 
understand how dictionary words or phrases are used. 
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In comparing the privacy dictionary categories to the coverage of other popular 
dictionaries, such as LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2007), General Inquirer (Stone et al., 1966), or the 
semantic categories of Wmatrix (Rayson, 2009), it must be acknowledged that the former 
represent narrower constructs in the psychological landscape. More generally, content analysis 
categories will often deal with words in the ‘long tail’ (i.e. those words which form the vast 
majority of language, but which are used infrequently) and while the words included in the 
privacy dictionary may not be ubiquitous in everyday language use, our results demonstrate that 
they are used in a consistent manner when expressing issues surrounding privacy. We note that a 
similar conclusion has been drawn for some LIWC dictionary categories, e.g., Sexuality and 
Religion, whose mean word frequency across 43 studies was 0.2. With the view of understanding 
how the privacy dictionary may function across datasets of different breadth and depth, 
differences revealed between the two studies are informative. In both studies, the most frequently 
used words were from the categories PrivateSecret, NegativePrivacy and OpenVisible. In Study 
2, word rates for these categories were higher which is likely due to the shorter texts collected. 
Use of words in the remaining five dictionary categories was variable. It is our hope that the 
widespread use of the privacy dictionary in future research will lead to a cumulative 
understanding on whether certain dictionary categories appear consistently during the expression 
of all privacy episodes and if some categories are specific to particular types of contexts.  
Potential Applications of the Privacy Dictionary 
In light of the particular strengths of automated content analysis (e.g. longitudinal, 
comparative analysis), we believe that the categories encapsulated in the dictionary can 
contribute towards investigating a number of longstanding questions about privacy in different 
contexts. In conducting comparative studies with the dictionary, social scientists may want to 
analyse privacy preferences across gender, age, socio-economic status or class dimensions, to 
understand how these differ between groups. This can be further used to support a citizen-centric 
political agenda by highlighting how citizen privacy priorities differ in the context of 
technological projects such as the introduction of the NHS Summary Care Record or the national 
identity cards in the UK for instance. In addition, designers may use the dictionary to develop 
more appropriate, personalised privacy settings to ensure that privacy is designed-in and 
safeguarded appropriately according to a diverse range of requirements from different types of 
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users. There has already been considerable interest in understanding privacy within the highly 
sensitive contexts of socio-technical environments. In these contexts, researchers have 
determined that certain components of privacy, such as control and openness, are particularly 
salient as a result of the constraints and possibilities built into the architecture of technological 
systems (Palen & Dourish, 2003; Joinson & Paine, 2007; Strickland & Hunt, 2005). This has 
stimulated an on-going interest in examining whether users are cognizant of the dangers raised in 
relation to their own technology use (Adams & Sasse, 1999). The privacy dictionary provides the 
means for comparing technology users’ language and the language employed by academics and 
policy makers to locate where incongruence lies. Explorations into the differences between these 
two groups can then direct designers’ attention to the most problematic aspects of technological 
design and prove new insights on how to overcome them.  
As a tool for longitudinal research, the privacy dictionary can allow researchers to 
measure the temporal evolution of privacy. For example, using the dictionary, social scientists 
may want to track people’s use of language over time in order to understand how people 
perceptions, understandings and expectations vis-à-vis privacy have shifted. This can help 
highlight emerging priorities for policy makers as well as provide historical context for policy 
debates and decision-making. In exploiting its potential to analyse online materials, technologists 
may want to measure the levels of privacy language within an online community that has 
recently undergone design changes (e.g. changes in privacy settings) raising awareness about 
escalating privacy violations. Technologists can also take preventive steps in launching 
discussion threads around impeding design changes and through levels of privacy language 
gauge users’ reactions as regards their privacy, further elucidated through a comparison to earlier 
discussions on successful technological implementations.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, privacy has become a critical social issue of the information age 
(Strickland & Hunt, 2005; Yao et al., 2007). Difficulties in defining privacy have rendered tools 
for its measurement a key challenge (Patil et al., 2006). In this paper, we proposed a novel 
technique for measuring privacy through language. The privacy dictionary is a resource that can 
be used with existing automated content analysis software, such as LIWC 2007. A unifying 
theoretical framework informed the dictionary words and categories which were first tested and 
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refined on a dataset of 334 texts balanced between privacy and a control condition, and sampled 
from a rich variety of contexts e.g. health, social network sites, children and the internet. The 
dictionary categories were subsequently evaluated with a second dataset containing self-reported 
privacy violations. It was shown that the dictionary categories could distinguish differences 
between privacy discussions and general language use. In carving up the space for future 
research, we provided several examples of possible applications for the dictionary for research, 
policy and technology development. 
 Footnotes 
(1) To control for dependencies across participants taking part in focus group discussions, the 
contributions of all participants in a focus group (excluding the facilitator) are included as a 
single case in our analysis. 
(2) In using Google to search for the (approximate) number of results for each of the main four 
blogging platforms/domains for the previous year the results are as follows: Blogspot.com 
(850M), Wordpress.com (235M), Livejournal.com (77.6M), and Typepad.com (2.33M). 
Supplementary Material 
The dictionary is available under the Creative Commons license and can be obtained 
through correspondence with Asimina Vasalou (minav@luminainteractive.com). More 
information about the dictionary can be found at www.privacydictionary.info. 
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